This paper studies the impact of public infrastructure on economic performance. We employ three di¤erent methodologies to estimate the returns to public investment. First, we relate growth in total factor productivity to accumulation of public capital. Second, we assess the role of public capital as an input to production. Third, we evaluate the reduction in costs that can be attributed to the presence of public infrastructure. Using regional data for Italy, we …nd that the aggregate impact of public capital is positive and signi…cant under the …rst approach, slightly negative under the second, and virtually zero under the third. More coherent results obtain when disaggregating by geographical area and time period: under all three approaches, the e¤ectiveness of public investment seems to be increasing over time and to be higher in Central and Southern regions than in Northern ones.
Introduction
The role of public infrastructure in stimulating productivity growth and reducing production costs has received increasing attention from both policy makers and researchers. The former have generally maintained that public capital enhances economic performance, and have been mainly concerned with where to invest, in what, and how much. The latter, on the other hand, have recently taken a step back and investigated whether a positive e¤ect of public capital can indeed be taken for granted.
Findings on this point have been mixed, depending on the theoretical models, econometric techniques, and datasets used. The ambivalence of the results challenges the rationale for public infrastructure provision as an input in the growth process, a serious issue for policymakers. This paper attempts to shed light on the relationships between public infrastructure, total factor productivity and production costs, both in theory and in practice. From a methodological point of view, our contribution is a critical comparison of the main competing approaches to evaluating the returns to public investment, highlighting the conditions under which they should yield the same results. On the empirical side, we implement the di¤erent methodologies using the same dataset, a task that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been undertaken.
The setting in which our empirical analysis is carried out is Italian regions in the period 1970-94. This setting is particularly interesting in view of the growing e¤orts on behalf of European institutions to integrate the economies of member countries and promote growth in relatively backward areas. In fact, Italy reproduces within itself many of the contrasts and di¤erences that exist among European countries: the productive structure and the level of development of Italian regions varies widely, going from the rich and industrialized regions of the North to the relatively poor regions of the South. Understanding the di¤erential impact of infrastructure investment in these areas can therefore shed some light on the role that public investment at the European level can serve to promote economic growth in relatively backward regions. In this sense, our analysis shares the motivation of the work by De la Fuentes and Vives (1995) , who have studied the role of public investment in education and infrastructure in reducing regional disparities in Spain.
Broadly speaking, the existing empirical literature can be grouped into three methodological strands. First, there have been studies relating public capital accumu-lation to the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP), computed as a residual from growth accounting (e.g., Schwab (1984, 1991) ). Second, public capital has been included as an input in the production function, and its marginal returns have been estimated (e.g., Aschauer (1989a Aschauer ( , 1989b , Munnell (1990a Munnell ( , 1990b , Holtz-Eakin (1994), Evans and Karras (1994) ). Third, the contribution of infrastructure investment to reducing production costs has been assessed (e.g., Morrison and Schwartz (1994, 1996) , Seitz and Licht (1995) ). The empirical results di¤er not only across methodologies, but also within the same approach. Hulten and Schwab (1991) …nd a weak relationship between the growth rates of TFP and of public capital. Aschauer (1989a), on the contrary, reports evidence in favor of a high and signi…cant elasticity of production to public capital, i.e. approximately . 35. Munnel (1990a) also …nds a similar estimate for this elasticity when using data for the US as a whole, but a lower value (around .15) when using state level data. Within the same production function framework, Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Evans and Karras (1994) show that, when controlling for state speci…c e¤ects, public capital does not seem to play a signi…cant role. Finally, Morrison and Schwartz (1994, 1996) report a positive but quantitatively limited impact of public infrastructure on cost reduction but …nd that, when they take into account the e¢ciency loss due to …nancing public investment through taxation, the net e¤ect is close to zero. 1 While the above studies use data from the United States, recently there have been studies on Italy (e.g., Picci (1995a) , , Bonaglia, La Ferrara and Marcellino(2000) ). Within the production function approach, Picci (1995a) uses regional data for Italy and reports an elasticity of production to public capital of .43 and .35 with …xed and random e¤ects, respectively. When performing robustness checks, however, he …nds that this result is weakened. Rossi and Toniolo, following a cost function methodology with a century long dataset , focus more on the relationships among production inputs, and …nd that public and private capital are substitute in the short run but become complement in the long run for most of the sample period. Finally, Bonaglia et al. (2000) estimate the impact of di¤erent categories of public capital (e.g. transportation, sanitation and education) on economic performance, and …nd di¤erent results depending on the methodology used.
It is di¢cult to assess whether the discrepancy in the above results, both for Italy and for the US, is due to the di¤erent methodologies used by the various studies, to di¤erent data sets, or to some other factor. A …rst goal of the present study is to apply all the existing approaches consistently to the same data set (Italian regional data for the period 1970-94), in order to isolate the potential sources of ambiguity in the results. Furthermore, we specify the conditions under which, from a theoretical point of view, we can expect to …nd a correspondence among the quantitative values of the parameters estimated with the various approaches, and we test these correspondences in our data. Finally, we attempt to analyze the impact of infrastructure at a more detailed level than the simple national level, by disaggregating our data in two ways. First, we run our regressions separately over various sub-periods, to allow for structural changes in the parameters over time. Second, we consider four Italian 'macroregions' separately, to account for the di¤erent economic and production structures that may prevail in those areas. In all cases, we control for potential endogeneity problems of the public capital variable by applying two-stage-least-squares, and we check the robustness of our results.
Our …ndings show …rst of all marked di¤erences in the sources of growth in di¤erent geographic areas. Overall, the relatively high growth rates of the North East and the Center are mostly attributable to higher than average total factor productivity growth. Both labor and private capital in fact grew very little in those regions in the sample period. The South, on the contrary, had extremely low TFP growth rates and managed to achieve an average growth rate of real value added between 2 and 3 percent per year only thanks to signi…cant private capital accumulation. Starting from these facts, we can expect to …nd interesting di¤erences in the impact of public infrastructure on productivity in Northern, Central, and Southern regions.
On the pooled sample (regional time series data for the whole Italy) the three methodological approaches yield di¤erent results. Overall, public investment in infrastructure seems to have contributed positively to TFP growth (the share of TFP growth that can be attributed to public capital accumulation is estimated to be .45), while we fail to …nd a positive role for public capital as an input in the production function and in reducing costs. The estimated elasticity of costs to public capital for Italy as a whole is in fact -.02.
When we turn to disaggregated analysis, the results are more coherent across methodologies. Both the growth accounting and the production function approach suggest that public capital was least e¤ective in the 1970s, and that its e¤ective-ness has been improving over time. In terms of regional disaggregation, all three approaches indicate the Center and the South as the areas where infrastructure investment yields the highest bene…ts. This is particularly relevant in that those areas (especially the South) are less economically advanced compared to the North of Italy, so our analysis seems to support the scope for public investment in fueling economic development of relatively backward areas.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a theoretical framework for the analysis of the e¤ects of public infrastructure. In section 3 we brie ‡y comment on the Italian regional dataset that we use (more details can be found in the Data Appendix) and present descriptive statistics on the main variables of interest. In section 4 we develop the empirical analysis and discuss the results, while in section 5 we address issues of endogeneity and robustness of our estimates.
Finally, in section 6 we summarize the main conclusions of this study and highlight its limitations and scope for future research.
The theoretical framework
In this section we brie ‡y review the economic theory underlying the growth accounting, the production function, and the cost function approaches to infrastructure investment evaluation, both to provide a background for the interpretation of the results of the ensuing empirical analysis, and to highlight relationships, pitfalls and opportunities of the alternative methods.
The Total Factor Productivity approach
In the growth accounting literature, e.g. Schwab (1984, 1991) , the starting point is a production function that links real inputs to real output, under the assumption that factor remuneration equals their marginal product. With these hypotheses it is relatively straightforward to derive total factor productivity, and the question of interest is whether TFP can be at least in part explained by changes in the pattern of infrastructure investment.
Let us de…ne the factor inputs labor, private capital (capital henceforth), and public capital by L, K, and KG, while Q denotes gross output. Inputs are transformed into output according to the production function Q = AF (L; K), where A indicates Hicks neutral technological progress. 2 Under the hypothesis of pro…t maximizing behavior and competitive markets, the growth rate of A is
with S L and S K being the output shares of labor and capital. With constant returns to scale, the sum of S L and S K is 1. All the terms in the right hand side of equation (1) are known, and can be used to measure the growth in the index of technological progress,
²
A , usually referred to as TFP growth. So far we have not considered the role of public capital, KG. The latter can both a¤ect A, i.e., increase the productivity of the other factors as an externality, and it can be a direct (unpaid) input in the production function F , e.g., Q = e A(KG)F (L; K; KG), with e A(KG) = e AKG´. In this case the growth rate of TFP is
where´is the elasticity of A with respect to KG, e x is the elasticity of output to input x (x = L; K; KG), and
² »
A is "true" technological progress. Combining (1) and (2), we get
Equation (3) is more general than standard speci…cations in the growth accounting literature. For example, according to Hulten and Schwab (1991) , it is A is computed from equation (1) . From now on, we will refer to this approach as growth accounting.
The production function approach
A second way to evaluate the role of public capital is through what we may term a 'production function approach'. In agreement with the production function literature, e.g. Aschauer (1989a Aschauer ( , 1989b and Holtz-Eakin (1994), a Cobb Douglas speci…cation is adopted. Services from public capital are considered as a direct factor input, usually proxied by the stock of available infrastructure, and the main question is whether the elasticity of output to this input is positive and signi…cant.
Assuming that KG is a direct input, and under the hypothesis on technological progress we made in the growth accounting framework (A(KG) = A ¤ KG´), we have
where lower case letters denote logarithms. The question of interest is whether the overall elasticity of production to public capital,´+ e KG , is positive and signi…cant.
Introducing hypotheses on the returns to scale, di¤erent speci…cations are obtained. With constant returns to private inputs only, it is
When there are constant returns to all inputs, we get the speci…cation in Aschauer (1989b):
In the case of overall decreasing returns to scale,
In all cases the coe¢cient of kg (or of kg ¡ l; depending on the speci…cation) is equal to that of ² KG in the growth accounting framework, equation (4) . Yet, if invalid hypotheses on the returns to scale are made, the estimator of the coe¢cient of kg can be biased, as stressed by Holtz-Eakin (1994). Hence, if the hypothesis of a Cobb Douglas speci…cation is correct and no invalid assumptions on the return to scale are made, the growth accounting and the production function approaches should lead to the same conclusions about the e¤ects of public capital on TFP and output growth.
The cost function approach
The dual problem, i.e., whether there are substantial cost savings in the presence of public infrastructure has also received attention, e.g. Morrison and Schwartz (1994, 1996) , Seitz and Licht (1995) . The starting point is the speci…cation of a cost function:
where G is a variable cost function. Private capital, infrastructure, and output are included among its arguments to take into account …xity, availability of (free) public capital, and scale economies. Other arguments are the price of labor, w, and a linear trend, t, that proxies for technology improvements. 3 The counterpart of marginal product in the cost function framework is the shadow value, i.e., the change in variable costs due to a marginal variation in an input. We label the shadow values of private and public capital as z K and z KG , respectively, and de…ne them as
The corresponding elasticities are
Because KG only a¤ects variable costs, it is ' KG = z KG KG=C, that can be interpreted as the shadow share of public capital.
The …rst order conditions for cost minimization imply that the optimal level of K satis…es z K = c, where c is the user cost of private capital. Unfortunately a similar condition cannot be directly employed for the determination of public capital, …rst because the level of KG cannot be decided by the …rm, and second because its price for the …rm itself is zero, assuming no direct links between the tax bill and infrastructure usage. Nonetheless, it makes sense to compare the shadow value of KG with a measure of its opportunity cost, say c KG , in order to determine the optimal level of KG. A positive shadow value indicates that public capital reduces costs, but z KG should be at least as big as the social user cost, c KG , for the investment to be convenient. Synthetic indexes to evaluate investment are
A positive value of E signals over-investment, and a negative value under-investment.
To obtain an estimate of each of the quantities in (10), (11), and (12) we adopt …rst a Cobb Douglas cost function, in order to obtain results that are qualitatively comparable to those from the production function (see Appendix A for more details).
Then we follow Morrison and Schwartz (1994, 1996) and assume a more ‡exible functional form, namely a generalized Leontief cost function (see Appendix B for details).
The data
In this section we brie ‡y describe the data we use in our empirical analysis and then present some descriptive statistics and simple correlations to get a sense of the main patterns. For a full de…nition of the variables and sources the reader is referred to Appendix C.
Data sources and de…nitions
Throughout the analysis we use yearly data at the regional level, currently the smallest disaggregation level available in Italy for which there is su¢cient time series data for all the variables. The sample period is 1970-1994. 4 We concentrate on the regional industrial sector, which includes Industry in the strictest sense, Energy, and Constructions.
Our output measure is regional value added at constant 1990 prices. The series is built merging the ISTAT (1997a,b) data for 1980-95 with data from Fondazione EniEnrico Mattei (1994). Labor input is measured as total labor units, i.e. dependent and autonomous workers, in the industrial sector. Wages are taken to be equal to those of dependent workers, due to the absence of data on incomes of autonomous workers disaggregated by sector and region.
The stock of private capital is constructed with the perpetual inventory method.
First of all, a benchmark stock of capital is constructed by summing investment ‡ows over a number of years equal to the average economic life of the investment goods under consideration (e.g., 15 years for equipment and machinery, 10 years for transportation, 50 years for constructions). 5 Starting from this initial value, the capital stock for every year is obtained by adding investment in that year, and subtracting the value of capital goods that become obsolete in that year.
The stock of public capital disaggregated by region and category is taken from Bonaglia and Picci (1999) . They apply the perpetual inventory method to regional time series for executed public investment (published in Istat (1954 Istat ( -1992 ) to apportion the aggregate capital stock estimated by Rossi, Sorgato and Toniolo (1993).
The categories of public capital included are the following: Land (e.g., land reclaimation and irrigation); Communications; Education (e.g., buildings for educational and social activities); Water (e.g., river planning); Sanitation (e.g., sewers, water …lter-ing, hospitals); Roads; Railways (e.g., railways and subways); Marine (e.g., ports, lake and river navigation); Other (e.g., gas-pipelines, infrastructures for tourism).
As for the source of …nancing, the data includes public works …nanced by the State (Ministries and Cassa per il Mezzogiorno); Public Adiministration (Regional, Provin- 4 Of course, to build capital stocks we use data going back to before 1970, so 1970-94 must be intended as the period covered by our regressions. Unfortunately, data availability on public capital constrains our period to end in 1994. 5 For a review of the average lives of di¤erent categories of investment goods in various countries, the reader is referred to Rosa and Siesto (1985) . Another useful reference on the perpentual inventory method is ISTAT (1995 (Picci (1995b) shows that southern regions are ranked systematically higher with the permanent inventory method than with physical index.
Despite these discrepancies, we are forced to use the investment-based measure due to lack of data. Notice that as a consequence of the possible over-estimation of KG for Southern regions, one could …nd downward biased regression coe¢cients.
Next, following Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and King (1972) , we de…ne the user cost of private capital as
where p E K is the 'e¤ective price' of private capital, i.e., the investment de ‡ator adjusted for taxation and subsidies (see appendix B for a precise de…nition); r and ± are, respectively, the rate of return and the depreciation rate. The construction of a 'social user cost' of public capital, c KGt , is a controversial issue (see e.g., Harper et al. (1989) , Ballard and Fullerton (1992) ). We choose to compute c KGt with a similar formula to (13) , except that in place of p E K we use the public investment de ‡ator; r and ±; instead, are assumed to be the same as for c. 6 Finally, TFP growth is calculated as in equation (1), where S L is the share of total labor compensation on value added, and
Notice that S L includes compensations for both employees and self employed, where average earnings for self employed are assumed to be the same as for employees. We can not adjust for factor utilization, due to the lack of data. In fact, the two most commonly used corrections 6 Morrison and Schwartz (1996a, 1996b) compute the user cost of public capital in a similar way, but they adjust it for the marginal e¢ciency cost of …nancing public investment through taxation.
We do not know of any reliable estimate of the latter for Italy, hence we omit this adjustment in our calculation.
for factor utilization, namely hours worked for labor and electricity consumption for capital, are not available at the regional level for the whole sample, to the best of our
knowledge. Yet, inclusion of time dummies in the regressions may capture cyclicality and attenuate the problem.
Output, private inputs and TFP
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics on the growth rate of real value added, and on its decomposition into the share attributable to private capital, labor and TFP. These values correspond, respectively, to
L , and ² A in expression (1). We also report the growth rate of public capital. The …gures are disaggregated by period, and by macroregion, i.e. North West, North East, Center, and South.
Details on the composition of the macroregions can be found in Appendix C.
[Insert Table 1 Average TFP growth is rather low (1.3%), and constant across subperiods for the whole Italy. Yet, it is higher in the North East, where it reaches 2.2%, and it is close to zero in the South (0.6%). The Center has similar average TFP growth rates to the North-West, though the temporal pattern is rather di¤erent, with higher growth in the Center in the '70s, and viceversa in the '80s. The relative advantage of the North East -and disadvantage of the South -holds across all subperiods.
Overall the good relative performance of North Eastern and Central regions seems to be mostly attributable to higher than average TFP growth. The North West had a respectable TFP growth rate, but did markedly worse in terms of labor (and partly capital) accumulation. But the most striking fact is that overall the South had higher labor and capital growth rates than the North East (4.4% and -0.2% for South versus 3.4% and -0.3% for North East), yet grew almost one percentage point less per year.
A possible explanation for this pattern is the policy of incentives to private investment and hiring in the South. Some authors, e.g. Prosperetti and Varetto (1991) , argue that this policy has led to 'overcapitalization' and, in general, to a relative ine¢ciency of southern …rms compared to northern ones. Others, e.g., Del Monte and Giannola (1997), view the relatively high capital labor ratio in the south as a rational response by …rms to the presence of higher costs of intermediate goods. 7 The single most important factor responsible for the regional growth di¤erentials appears to be TFP growth. Since Meade (1952), it has been widely recognized in the literature that public investment in infrastructure is one of the main potential determinants of TFP. As we can see from Table 1 , the average annual growth rate of public capital in Italy was 2.7% over the period 1970-94, more than 1.5 percentage points higher than that of private capital. It is also worth pointing out that, in all subperiods, public capital growth was higher in the Northern regions (about 3%) than in the Center and in the South (2.3% and 2.5%, respectively). The widely held notion that the South receives a disproportionate share of public spending compared to the Center and especially the North must be understood as related to transfer payments as opposed to public investment in capital goods.
The pattern of growth of public capital over time is decreasing, with values of 3.2% in the '70s, 2.5% in the '80s, and 2.1% in the early '90s. Though such a pattern could be correlated with the decrease in output growth, the decline is also present in the growth rates of private inputs. Hence, before drawing any conclusions on the role of public capital in enhancing growth, we need to take into account the interaction among all productive inputs, and turn to multivariate analysis. 4 The role of public capital
Results from growth accounting
In table 2 we report estimates of equation (4), namely, we regress TFP growth on the growth rate of public capital ( ² KG) and of private capital ( ² K ), with …xed e¤ects included in the regressions. 8 9 As already mentioned in Section 2, the coe¢cient on ² KG measures the overall elasticity of output with respect to public capital,´+ e KG .
It is clear from the …rst column of We then estimate the regression separately for the periods 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-94; the results are reported, respectively, in columns 2, 3, and 4 of table 2. The maximum impact obtains in the eighties, with an elasticity of T F P to KG of :82; the lowest one is the seventies, with an elasticity of :24, while the estimated value for the …rst half of the nineties is :53. In the light of this pattern, we can think that most of the skepticism regarding the productivity enhancing role of public capital comes from the experience of the 1970s, rather than from the most recent years. As 8 We started with the more general equation (3), but ² Lt was never signi…cant (results are available). There also appears to be no need of random e¤ects (the Breusch Pagan test yields a p-value of :53). The low values of R 2 obtained in our regressions are common to the literature (e.g., Hulten
and Schwab (1991)), and likely depend on the fact that the dependent variable is a residual. 9 The empirical results for the growth accounting and the production function approaches are we will see, the temporal pattern of increasing e¤ectiveness of public capital in recent years will also emerge from the production function approach. Among the potential explanations for such a pattern, improved administrative e¢ciency is likely to have played a non negligible role.
In the last four columns of 
Results from the production function approach
We now illustrate the empirical results that arise from the production function approach. Table 3 reports the estimated coe¢cients for a Cobb Douglas speci…cation as in equation (5), using …xed e¤ects and time dummies. 10 From the …rst column of table 3, the elasticity of output to public capital, e KG , for Italy is negative, while that to private capital is positive and signi…cant, 0:14. Repeating the analysis over di¤erent subperiods, however, we can see that the negative impact of public capital on output only holds for the Seventies, while in the Eighties and Nineties such impact is signi…cantly positive and increasing (the estimated coe¢cient on the log of KG for these periods is, respectively, :17 and :56). The temporal pattern of the e¤ect of public capital is broadly similar to that of the growth accounting approach. 10 The hypothesis of …xed versus random e¤ects is often rejected, yet the regressors appear to be correlated with the random regional errors. Hence, we prefer to focus on the …xed-e¤ects model, that yields consistent, even though, not e¢cient estimators. Cyclical ‡uctuations need also to be accounted for, in order to avoid spurious correlations. To evaluate whether there is any cyclicality left after inclusion of the time dummies (which also allow to account for exogenous changes in the rate of growth of technological progress), we have tried including inventories as an explicit cyclical variable. However, inventories do not improve our explanatory power in any way, hence we do not keep them in the …nal speci…cation. Notice that the reported high values of R 2 in table 3 are due to the time dummies.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Further useful information can be gained from regional disaggregation. Columns 5-8 of table 3 report results for the four macroregions, using regional and time dummies. It turns out that public capital is mostly productive in the South, followed by the Center, and not productive in the North East and North West.
The last row of table 3 reports the p-value for the test of constant returns to all inputs. The null of constant returns is accepted at the 5 percent for the '70s and the '90s, and rejected for the '80s. In terms of geographical areas, the hypothesis is accepted for the Center and the South, rejected for Northern regions.
A potential objection to our interpretation of the above results is that the positive correlation between public capital and production may work through demand as opposed to supply. To discriminate among the two channels, one may want to exploit the fact that demand e¤ects are likely to take place at the time the investment is undertaken, while the impact on supply can be expect to last longer. To perform a test along these lines, one would need either project level data or a long enough time series to allow for estimation of dynamic models with a su¢cient number of lags.
Unfortunately, neither is currently available. However, we believe that the supply side interpretation can be maintained for two main reasons. First, to the extent that the expansionary e¤ects of public investment translate into increased labor demand and private investment, they should already be taken into account by the fact that we include L and K as inputs in the production function (and explanatory variables in the regressions). Second, our empirical results on the time pattern of public capital e¤ectiveness go in the opposite direction to what a demand side interpretation would suggest. In fact, public investment was higher in the '70s than in the '80s, which should have led to a bigger impact on demand, while both the production function and the growth accounting approaches yield higher coe¢cients on public capital for the '80s as compared to the '70s.
Results from the cost function approach
Having considered the e¤ects of public capital on output growth, we now evaluate its role in cost reduction. This requires estimating the system of equations reported 11 The variable ' KG , which is the cost elasticity to public capital taken with the opposite sign, should be positive for KG to be cost reducing.
Instead, the estimated value for Italy is negative, though very close to zero. As a result, E KG is positive, :27, suggesting over-investment in KG at the national level.
E KB is also positive, while E KM = ¡:02, suggesting under-investment in machinery.
Repeating the analysis over subperiods, ' KG is positive only in the '70s, and negative in later periods. Even for the …rst period, however, the cost reducing e¤ect of public capital is not su¢cient to cover its social user cost: in fact E KG remains positive. On the other hand, E KM and E KB are only negative, respectively, in the '80s and in the early '90s.
Noticeable di¤erences across macroregions also emerge. From table 4, columns 5-8, the best performance is in the Center, followed by the South, while the estimated values of ' KG are negative for the North-East and, in particular, for the North-West.
Again, when we take into account the opportunity cost of infrastructure investment, E KG is positive even for the Center. The latter results could be due to overestimation of the user cost of public capital, c KGt , that is substantially higher than its private capital counterpart, c. As far as private capital is concerned, there appears to be under-investment in machinery in the North-West and in buildings in the NorthEast. 11 We include a time trend in the regression because time dummies increase substantially the number of parameters without a¤ecting the goodness of …t of the model.
Comparing the results
We should now pause to compare the estimates obtained under the three approaches.
Comparing the TFP and the production function methods (tables 2 and 3, respectively), it is apparent that the latter gives estimates on the coe¢cient of KG that are systematically lower than the former. Vice versa, the estimated coe¢cient on private capital in the production function approach is generally higher than in the growth accounting (notable exceptions are the North West and North East).
This second result is not surprising. In fact, we can see from equation (5) that the coe¢cient on k in the production function approach is the elasticity e K ; while that
, depending on whether (3) or (4) is estimated.
Therefore we should always be getting a lower coe¢cient on private capital from the growth accounting approach, possibly negative when there are decreasing returns to K and L (and in fact we can see from the last row of table 3 that a negative coe¢cient on ² K occurs whenever the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected and there appear to be decreasing returns to K and L).
The di¤erent coe¢cients on public capital, on the other hand, are much harder to explain. In fact, as we showed in the theoretical section, both approaches should yield the same estimates, equal to (´+ e KG ). The only cases in which we obtain virtually identical estimates are the period 1990-94 for Italy, and the North East.
In all other cases, the growth accounting method yields higher coe¢cients than the production function one. A possible reason is that in the production function speci…cation we include a set of time dummies that may attenuate the explanatory power of KG (in fact, when we leave the time dummies out, the coe¢cient on public capital increases substantially). Other reasons may have to do with in ‡uential observations or endogeneity, and we will address these points in the next section.
Overall, we can see that despite the discrepancy in the quantitative impact of public capital which we observe in some cases, the qualitative pattern that emerges from the two approaches is very similar. The e¤ectiveness of public investment has increased over time (in particular, compared to the '70s), and the macro regions where such e¤ectiveness is highest are, in the order, the South and the Center.
Turning to the cost function methodology, we cannot directly compare the estimates in quantitative terms, but again some qualitative features remain the same as in the other approaches. In particular, the South and the Center are still the areas where public capital is most e¤ective (though the ranking among the two is now reversed). The time pattern is now markedly di¤erent, suggesting a decrease in the cost saving role of public capital from the '70s to the '80, and a slight improvement from the '80s to the '90s (though still lower e¤ectiveness than in the '70s). This di¤erence may be due to di¤erences in the speci…cation of the model 12 , and also to the few degrees of freedom that remain when we estimate the cost system on subsets of the sample. In the next section we experiment with a more ‡exible functional form for the cost function, and we …nd that the temporal pattern found for the other approaches is reinstated.
Causality and sensitivity analysis
In this section we explore the robustness of our estimates to the presence of outliers, we deal with potential endogeneity problems and/or measurement error, and we address the issue of the functional form for the cost function approach.
In order to control for in ‡uential observations whose presence can sensibly bias the estimators, we calculate the DFbetas and drop the observations that lead to major changes in the parameters when included in the sample. 13 Table 5 reports our estimates of the production function for the sample purged of in ‡uential observations.
14 [Insert Table 5 here]
Comparing these results with those obtained from the full sample (table 3) , we …nd that the estimated coe¢cient on KG is very similar for Italy as a whole, and fairly similar for the South (:28 as compared to :37, both signi…cant at the 5 percent level). 12 In order to separate between variable and …xed costs, the Cobb Douglas in this approach only includes private capital in transportation, and not the total stock of private capital. 13 In particular, we dropped those observations for which abs(DF beta) > 2= p #obs (see Belsley et al. (1980) , p.28). 14 In this section, for expositional purposes we concentrate on the production function approach and perform the various possible tests. We have also repeated similar tests for the other approaches and no signi…cant di¤erences emerged. The disaggregation into subperiods is not reported because, once we drop the in ‡uential observations, we are left with too few observations for 1990-94.
The coe¢cient for the Center is also positive, though not statistically signi…cant, and that for the North is virtually zero. The most important di¤erence emerges with respect to North-Eastern regions. While in the full sample we found a coe¢cient of ¡:14 on KG, when we drop in ‡uential observations the same coe¢cient is estimated to be :16 (signi…cant at the 10 percent level). Nonetheless, the qualitative pattern of highest e¤ectiveness of public capital in the Center and South as opposed to the North remains unchanged.
We next turn to the issue of potential endogeneity of public capital. We can think of two reasons why the link between output and public capital may go in the opposite direction to that hypothesized here. First, regions with higher output may be regions where KG is systematically higher, for example because those are fast growing regions and public investment is more productive in an environment where technology grows faster. Second, public intervention may be targeted towards relatively poorer areas with the aim of improving incentives for private investment. In the former case, we can expect the OLS coe¢cient on KG to be upward biased, in the latter to be downward biased. Another source of bias in the OLS coe¢cient for KG would be measurement error. To cope with these problems, in table 6 we present two stage least squares of the role of public capital in production.
[Insert Table 6 here]
We use two instruments for KG: (i) a one-year lag of the stock of public capital for a given region (in logs), which we call KGlag; and (ii) the average contemporaneous stock of public capital in neighboring regions (still in logs), which we denote KGnb.
Notice that with the latter instrument we lose two regions which are islands (Sicily and Sardinia). From the …rst column of Table 6 , the coe¢cient on public capital for Italy is virtually identical to that found without instrumentation (…rst column of table 3).
When we disaggregate the sample over macro regions, we …nd again a positive (though not statistically signi…cant) coe¢cient on public capital for Central and Southern regions, and negative coe¢cients for the North West and North East (the latter two being very similar in magnitude to those obtained without instrumentation). We therefore conclude that our results hold when controlling for the potential endogeneity and measurement error in public capital, which is nonetheless important according to the outcomes of the Hausman test, reported in the last row of table 6. Two stage least squares on the sample purged of in ‡uential observations are reported in Table   C .1 of Appendix C. In that table, no signi…cant di¤erence emerges.
Finally, in table 7 we explore the robustness of our results to the speci…cation of a di¤erent functional form in the cost function approach. Following Morrison (1988) and Morrison and Schwartz (1994, 1996b) , we assume that the variable cost function is a Generalized Leontief (analytical details are provided in Appendix B).
[Insert Table 7 here]
Compared to the results in table 4 , where a Cobb Douglas speci…cation was adopted, two main di¤erences emerge. First, the temporal pattern is now in line with that suggested by the growth accounting and the production function approach:
the e¤ectiveness of public capital is now generally increasing over time, leading to the highest cost savings in the 1990s. Second, the pattern across macro regions is now di¤erent: the North East is now the area where public investment has the largest impact, while such impact is basically zero (or even negative) for the Center and the South.
Conclusions
The potential for a productivity enhancing role of public infrastructure has been highly emphasized in recent years. Yet, empirical evidence has been mixed at best.
This paper attempts to conduct a systematic analysis of the impact of public capital on TFP, production, and costs by comparing the three main existing theoretical approaches, and implementing them with regional data for Italy.
At the national level, the …rst approach indicates a strong positive e¤ect of public capital accumulation on TFP growth; the second approach gives a (small) negative elasticity of production to public capital; and the third approach indicates virtually no e¤ect of public capital on variable costs. The results are more coherent across methodologies when we disaggregate the sample by time periods and by geographical areas. According to all three methodologies, the e¤ectiveness of public infrastructure has increased over the years, especially in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. Also, all three indicate Central and Southern regions as the areas where public capital is most
productive.
An important caveat is in order. Our analysis is con…ned to the manufacturing sector, in the sense that the output measures or the costs which we use as dependent variables refer to that sector only. We cannot infer that our results would remained valid if a broader measure of output were used. Indeed, certain types of public investment (e.g., irrigation, land reclaimation, etc.) are most likely to have an impact on agricultural production than on the output of the manufacturing sector.
Scope remains for further work in several directions. First of all, it would be important to compare the bene…ts with an appropriate measure of the costs of public capital, taking into account for example the distortionary e¤ects of …nancing public investment through taxation. Second, the criteria and procedures for …nancing public investment are likely to play a role in the e¢ciency of its allocation, and it could be interesting to explore these links. Third, analogous procedures to those we use could be employed to assess the impact of other types of public expenditures which in theory should be productivity enhancing, e.g. in law and order or higher education.
Finally, a wider and more detailed set of data (e.g. at the provincial level) would be helpful to draw more accurate conclusions.
Appendix A. Cobb Douglas cost function
In our analysis we distinguish between variable inputs (labor, L, and private capital in transportation, KT ), and quasi-…xed inputs (public capital, KG, and private capital in buildings and machinery, KB and KM respectively, with KB + KM + KT = K).
Variable costs, G, depend on the price of the variable factors, on the level of output, on the state of technology, and on the level of the quasi-…xed inputs:
Total costs are given by:
where we are assuming that KG has a price of zero for the …rm.
For a Cobb Douglas technology, Q = AKT a L b , conditional factor demands for variable inputs are given by:
and
Assuming constant returns to variable inputs, a + b = 1, and taking logs, yields log G=Q = ¡A¡g log KG¡m log KM ¡d log KB +log ª+b log p L +a log p KT ; (19) where
Then, by Shepard's Lemma:
where
We estimate the system of equations formed by the log cost function (19), a factor share equation (20) and the optimality condition (the price of output equals the marginal cost).
+Q
taken to be the same, since no data are available for the latter. Regional consumer price indexes (Istat, 1997a ) are used to obtain real wages. 
with us standing for savings per unit, i.e.,
where ½ is the discount rate (that we assume equal to the interest rate charged by special investment banks called Istituti di Credito Speciale), ¿ is the tax rate on pro…ts, CC are government contributions to buy industrial capital given through Cassa del Mezzogiorno 17 , I are investments in the industrial sector, a and b are normal and ahead depreciation coe¢cients. Outlying observations are discarded using the Dfbeta method. Dependent variable is (log of) value added; KG; K and L are in logarithms. ¤ and ¤¤ indicate signi…cance at the 10% and 5% level respectively Standard errors are in parentheses (a) The null hypothesis is constant returns to scale to KG; K and L ' x is the shadow share of input x. E x is (U X ¡ Z X )x=C, where U X is the user cost of x; and C represents total costs. Dependent variable is (log of) value added; KG; K and L are in logarithms. ¤ and ¤¤ indicate signi…cance at the 10% and 5% level respectively Standard errors are in parentheses (a) The null hypothesis is constant returns to scale to KG, K and L Outlying observations are discarded using the Dfbeta method ' x is the shadow share of input x: E x is (U X ¡ Z X )x=C, where U X is the user cost of x; and C represents total costs.
